



October 11, 2024 Public Logic & Accuracy Test

Part 2

Introduction

This document addresses several concerns and inaccurate comments regarding the Public Logic and Accuracy Test of voting machines conducted on October 11, 2024.

Key Issues

1. Discrepancies in Election Offices Responses

Full letters are at the end of this document, these are just highlights of discrepancies from Oct 14 to Oct 19

Monday, Oct 14 email to CDF	Saturday, Oct 19 Election Office quote inside of Shelby William’s statement
<p>I want to address the issue with DS200 failing hash validation on Friday during the Public Logic and Accuracy Test. Since the Public L&A Test we have been able to further research the cause for failure, which I would like to share with you now.</p>	<p>“During the Public L&A Test one of the DS200 tabulators initially failed a hash validation process,</p>
<p>During our investigation and further research on DS200s, we found that performing the hardware diagnostics steps on a DS200 would prevent it from generating a successful hash file export from the unit.</p> <p>The first step that should have been taken on the DS200 that was pulled from the ESC prior to our beginning hash validation should have been to completely reset the machine by performing the EQC process, which was an oversight on our part.</p> <p>We have updated our notes regarding the hash validation process so this does not occur as we move forward with testing.</p>	<p><i>but subsequently it was discovered that it failed due to a missed step in performing the hash validation process</i></p>
<p>Our team was able to successfully replicate the failure on Saturday, October 12, 2024, as part of the investigation into the matter.</p>	<p><i>A successful hash validation was performed on a different DS200 tabulator during the Public L&A Test,</i></p>
<p>We were also able to successfully hash validate the DS200 that failed to pass on Friday during the Public Logic and Accuracy Test.</p>	<p><i>and additionally a successful hash validation was performed on the DS200 that initially failed the hash test some time later.</i></p>

This leads to the problem of mischaracterization.

2. Mischaracterization of the Problem

Some have characterized the issue as a "missed step." However, this characterization downplays the significance of the situation. In reality, the Elections Office had to add an entirely new step to their process (see quote below) by loading an Election Qualification Code (EQC) memory stick. This is not a simple missed step, but rather a fundamental change to the testing procedure that has never been performed on previous tests because they admit that they will be adding this step to their manual.

process, which was an oversight on our part. We have updated our notes regarding the hash validation process so this does not occur as we move forward with testing.

3. Statement on Reset

In CDF's original report, we used term "factory reset." That does, in fact, imply a total reset of the machine, and we accept the comment that the new process "doesn't completely reset the machine." But that is not the point of our comment.

CDF discovered last October that all machines used for testing are NOT subsequently deployed in the field. So, for this election, we requested the ability to randomly choose a machine for the Logic & Accuracy Test. The random selection of test machines, as opposed to reusing the same machines year after year, led to a significant discovery: the need for an entirely new reset step in the testing process. This finding underscores the importance of randomization in uncovering potential issues and raises more questions:

- What does this say about ES&S machines across the nation?
- Do all hash validations need to follow this procedure?
- How do other hash validations pass without performing this step?
- What exactly is the hardware diagnostics doing to the system?
- What is the EQC Reset doing to the system?

Since the system is a closed black-box, citizens are asked to blindly trust without verification.

4. Lack of Transparency in Reporting

- The report for the first machine that failed the hash validation was reportedly deleted, or it was never generated. This is a destruction of records or a failure to capture records, both of which are disturbing. Citizens will never know the exact circumstance of that failure because the records are missing. The recreation of the issue and subsequent fix of the original failed machine does imply that the mechanism is the same, but citizens will never know for sure.

- Additionally, there was no hash report for the 2nd machine that failed on October 11 either. Therefore, this means that the L&A test was run and eventually was approved with no hash reports for the failures and successes of the L&A test.

- All documentation of the issue came from the root cause analysis held from October 12 to October 15. In fact, the hash report that we received was generated on Tuesday, October 15th, three days after the retest on October 12th.

5. Insufficient Scrutiny of Test Files

On October 15th, we asked for reports from a failed DS200 and a successful one. We were told that the data for the Friday October 11th testing was not available, but we could get a report from one of the machines used to do the root cause analysis. Eventually we received a pass and a fail report for a DS-200 that was tested on October 15th.

The analysis of the files from the failed hash test revealed three additional files (XML and ZIP) that should not have been present. The presence of these unexpected files, particularly the ZIP file that caused the hash failure, raises significant concerns:

- The origin and content of these files remain unclear and unexamined. It would seem that the hardware diagnostic process is adding these files.
- While hardware diagnostic testing is mandatory, it should not leave behind residual files on voting machines prior to deployment.
- The potential impact of these files on system integrity is unknown and demands an investigation.



It is crucial to thoroughly examine these unexpected files rather than relying solely on vendor explanations. Simply trusting that these files are innocuous without proper verification compromises the integrity of the entire process.

6. Limited Scope of Verified Machines

Only 18 out of approximately 200 machines have been confirmed as hash-validated. This represents merely 9% of the total machines, leaving a significant majority unverified. This limited sample size is insufficient to ensure the integrity of the entire voting system.

However, this issue goes beyond a small sample size, which has been the case for multiple years. The issue is that the root cause of the verification failure implicates the hardware diagnostic as leaving unknown and possibly dangerous files in the system, followed by deployment to the field. With this in mind, every machine should have been EQC reset to eliminate spurious files.

We asked that they do this, but this request was ignored until it was too late to affect that change.



7. Collin County's Issue is Distinct from Dallas County

The hash failure in Collin County is unique and should not be conflated with issues in Dallas County. In Collin, we were permitted to randomly select a machine for hash validation that had already undergone hardware diagnostics. This raises important questions:

- Why did this error occur in Collin County but not in other jurisdictions using ES&S machines?
- If hardware diagnostics consistently interfere with hash validation, why isn't this a widespread issue nationally?
- Are other counties omitting this type of hardware testing, or is the test itself flawed?

8. Unfounded Narratives

CDF is aware of circulating narratives that only reflect one side of the story. We are happy to talk to citizens who may have questions. So far, we have only heard from a few citizens who have wanted to hear both sides of the issue, and we are grateful for them. If anyone else would like to contact us, feel free to do so.

9. Report Accuracy and Openness to Correction

We have not received any specific, factual challenges to our report. Criticisms thus far have been limited to ad hominem attacks and hearsay from individuals not present at the testing. Others have made statements without having the full context of what had transpired previously. For example, the whole idea that they just missed a step is NOT what was initially reported by the elections office.

We remain open to addressing any concrete issues with our report and will make corrections if necessary. However, vague accusations without substantive evidence do not constitute valid critiques.

Conclusion

While there have been attempts to reassure the public, key issues remain:

1. The addition of the EQC step represents a significant change in procedure, not a simple correction.
2. There are serious concerns about the transparency and documentation of the testing process.
3. The limited scope of verified machines does not provide sufficient assurance of system-wide integrity especially given the way that the machines failed
4. The deletion or failure to collect records is not acceptable.
5. The presence of unknown XML and ZIP files when deployed to the field is a serious violation of system security and should be investigated immediately by independent experts.

RECOMMENDATION

CDF calls for a more comprehensive and transparent review of all voting machines, clear documentation of all testing procedures and results, and independent verification of the hash validation process.

We also recommend that additional random machines be impounded (remove the power cords and put tamper-evident seals over the power connectors on the devices) so the Texas Attorney General can have them independently tested.

The integrity of our elections depends on rigorous and open procedures that can withstand public scrutiny.

Regardless of the concerns outlined in this document, CDF highly recommends that all citizens vote in this upcoming election.

Exhibit 1

Email from Election Office to Debbie Lindstrom, Election Division Lead

From Kaleb Breaux <kbreaux@co.collin.tx.us>
Date Mon 14/10/2024 12:23
To Debbie Lindstrom <dlindstrom@ccdfusa.com>; Bruce Sherbet <bsherbet@co.collin.tx.us>
Cc Tara Schulte <tschulte@ccdfusa.com>; Kathi Rivard <damn.yankee1973@gmail.com>; 'lisa babb.email' <lisa@babb.email>; 'KC McClain' <kcmclain@me.com>

Debbie,

Thank you for the email. I want to address the issue with DS200 failing hash validation on Friday during the Public Logic and Accuracy Test. Since the Public L&A Test we have been able to further research the cause for failure, which I would like to share with you now.

Prior to the Public Logic and Accuracy Test on Friday, our office agreed to pull hardware from Election Supply Cabinets that were prepared to be deployed to an Early Voting location for the November 5, 2024 election. This new process was implemented as a request made by Citizens Defending Freedom during previous Public L&A Tests performed over the last few years. This was a new process for our Public L&A Test this election. The equipment, specifically the DS200s, had already been hardware diagnostic tested by our warehouse team, as part of our normal process of preparing for the election. Part of the hardware diagnostics testing includes opening a unit, casting test votes on the unit, closing the unit, and finally clearing the results from the unit before it is sent to the location.

During our investigation and further research on DS200s, we found that performing the hardware diagnostics steps on a DS200 would prevent it from generating a successful hash file export from the unit. The first step that should have been taken on the DS200 that was pulled from the ESC prior to our beginning hash validation should have been to completely reset the machine by performing the EQC process, which was an oversight on our part. We have updated our notes regarding the hash validation process so this does not occur as we move forward with testing.

Our team was able to successfully replicate the failure on Saturday, October 12, 2024, as part of the investigation into the matter. To ensure the accuracy and integrity of our election equipment, we pulled 16 DS200s from ESCs that were to be deployed for the November 5, 2024 election, and successfully hash validated them before they were deployed. We were also able to successfully hash validate the DS200 that failed to pass on Friday during the Public Logic and Accuracy Test. It should be noted as stated during the test, our office WILL NOT deploy the failed DS200 from Friday's test into the field for the November 5, 2024 election.

Respectfully,



Kaleb Breaux
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<https://www.collincountytexas.gov/elections>

Exhibit 2

Shelby William's Statement about Logic and Accuracy Test (included to note the quote from the Elections Office)

<https://mailchi.mp/collincountygop/youre-invited-to-the-victory-2024-kickoff-celebration-8864392?e=ca3ef4cc4d>